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Guest Worker Policy:
A Critical Analysis of President Bush's
Proposed Reform
CAMILLE

J. BOSWORTH*

INTRODUCTION

United States President George W. Bush has talked publicly about

the need for immigration reform since assuming office in 2000. Reform
of the agricultural worker program continues to be a pressing issue. In
2001,

promising discussions between President Bush and Mexican

President Vicente Fox to reform the guest worker program and create an
amnesty program for undocumented immigrants living in the United
States were brought to an abrupt halt by the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center.' Three years later, in January 2004, President Bush

introduced another plan for immigration reform. It is now five years
later, President Bush is in his second term as President, and no

meaningful reform to the agricultural visa program has been enacted.
Focusing on Mexican workers, this Note traces the historical roots of
guest worker programs in the United States, analyzes the strengths and
shortcomings of President Bush's proposal and proposes that the Bush
administration adopt a longsighted approach to temporary agricultural

workers that addresses the reality that no temporary work program is
truly temporary.
I. A DEVELOPING POLICY OF EXCLUSION

Long before the threat of terrorism came to the forefront of the
national consciousness, the United States federal government engaged in
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005; B.A., cum laude, University
of California, Los Angeles, 2001. Many thanks to Professor Boswell for his input and guidance in
writing this Note. Thank you also to the Hastings Law Journal for all the hard work and to my family
for their encouragement and support.
I. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS 25 (2002); Alfredo Corchado,
Immigration Will Be Key Topic When Bush, Fox Meet Friday;Mexico's Ambassador Says Countries

Need To Regain Momentum,

DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

Mar.

19, 2002,

at 13A; Mary Jordan & Kevin

Sullivan, U.S. and Mexico to Resume Talks on Immigration Policy; Issue Will Be Recast as One of
National Security; Daschle, Gephardtto Meet With PresidentFox, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2ooI, at A4o.
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a costly, if not erratic, struggle to fortify the southernmost border.' These
efforts to block immigration conflict with the reality that at any given
time there are over eight million undocumented foreigners working in
the United States.3 An estimated sixty percent of these workers are
Mexican nationals, many of whom entered the United States illegally.4
The United States' economy is dependent upon the labor of
undocumented immigrants.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS MEXICO

The United States' restrictive policies towards immigration from
Mexico developed gradually. The Mexican-American War ended in 1848
and the United States acquired Arizona, California, New Mexico, Texas,
and parts of Colorado, Nevada and Utah. Until then, immigration
between Mexico and the United States was limited and largely informal.'
In 1921, the federal government initiated a quota system that limited
immigration on a per-country basis and set the total national cap at
350,000; however, these restrictions did not apply to Mexicans.

The

border patrol was established in 1924, but many years passed before it
played an active role at the U.S.-Mexico Border.7 A major reason for the
lax immigration policy towards Mexico was that farmers, ranchers,
miners, the sugar industry, and the railroads from the Southwest strongly
opposed efforts to limit immigration. 8 It was not until 1976 that a percountry quota was set for Western Hemisphere nations.9
B.

WOULD

You

TREAT YOUR GUESTS THIS WAY? THE BRACERO

PROGRAM

The first guest worker program in the United States, the Bracero
Program, was initiated in 1942 by the Roosevelt administration.'" In 1941
the United States entered World War II and many domestic agricultural
workers joined the armed forces or moved to the city for better paying
jobs." To avoid an agricultural labor shortage the Roosevelt
administration negotiated a treaty with Mexico providing for "temporary
importation of Mexican farm-workers," thus creating the Bracero

2. MASSEY ET AL., supra note I,at 26.

3. Bradley J. Condon & J. Brad McBride, Do You Know the Way toSan Jose? Resolving the
Problem of Illegal
Migration to the United States, 17 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 251, 283 (2003).

4. Id.
5. MASSEY ET AL., supra note I, at 25-26.
6. JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR. & JAMES G.

REFORM
7.
8.
9.
io.

GIMPEL, THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION

94 (999).
MASSEY ET AL., supra note I, at 26.
EDWARDS & GIMPEL, supra note 6, at 96.
Id.at 4o.
Id. at 35.

iI.Id.
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Program." The term "Bracero" translates roughly
as "farmhand" and is
3
derived from the Spanish word for arm, "brazo.'
The Bracero Program was actually a series of distinct immigration
programs,' 4 the first of which was initiated when the Immigration Service
formed an interagency committee, including the War Manpower
Commission and representatives from the departments of State,
Agriculture, and Justice, in order to develop a plan for the importation of
farm-workers.'5 Between May and August 1942, the Mexican and United
States governments negotiated the terms of the bi-national program.16
They reached a final agreement on August 4, 1942, in Mexico City.
The two nations agreed upon a number of principles. The program
allowed agricultural farm-workers to work in the United States for up to
nine months each year,'" Braceros were to be employed to meet
temporary labor needs and were not to displace domestic workers, the
United States was to pay recruitment and transportation costs for the trip
to the United States, a formal contract between worker and employer
stating work conditions was required, minimal standards of housing and
sanitation were to be guaranteed, ten percent of a worker's pay was to be
deposited in a savings account and reimbursed upon return to Mexico,
and Braceros were to be paid prevailing wages.'9 When the Bracero
Program started, the United States government acted as general
contractor and guaranteed the farmers' contracts with the workers." The
contracts, theoretically, included round-trip transportation and wages
equal to those earned by American workers, and allowed workers'
families to accompany them to the United States.' Workers were
contracted in Mexico, transported to the United States by train, then
placed in the custody of United States government officials, and sent to a
given location." In the beginning, Braceros worked for local or county
12. Id.
13. KITrY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE I (1992).
14- Id. at 1-2.
15. BARBARA A. DRISCOLL, THE TRACKS NORTH: THE RAILROAD BRACERO PROGRAM OF WORLD WAR

1153 (999).
I6. DRISCOLL, supra note i5, at 54.
17. Id. at 55. Mexico was not the only nation to send temporary workers to the United States;
workers also came from the Bahamas, Barbados, British Honduras, Costa Rica, and Canada through
similar, but much smaller, programs. Id. at 58. The agreements reached between the United States and
the other countries were less formal than the 1942 agreement between the United States and Mexico.
Id. Consequently, the workers were even less protected than the Braceros. Id. at 58-59.
I8. MICHAEL C. LEMAY, U.S. IMMIGRATION 266 (2004).
19. DRISCOLL, supra note 15, at 54-55.

20. Michael J. Mayerle, Comment, Proposed Guest Worker Statutes: An Unsatisfactory Answer to
a Difficult If Not Impossible Question, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 559, 564-65 (2002) (citing Philip
Martin, Guest Workers: Past and Present, in 3 MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES:
BINATIONAL STUDY 877, 880 (1998)).
21. Id.
22. CALAVITA, supra note 13, at 24; DRISCOLL, supra note i5, at 55.
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labor associations rather than individual farmers. 3 The associations
entered into the work contracts with Braceros and it was not uncommon
for a worker to be placed on a different farm everyday. 4
From the outset, employers in the United States did not closely
follow the provisions agreed to by the two nations. 5 In fact, when the
first group of Braceros returned to Mexico at the end of 1942, they
reported substandard working conditions, inadequate housing and
discrimination." A decade later, consistent dissatisfaction among
Braceros continued; complaints focused on low earnings because of work
shortage;" deductions for the cost of transportation, supplies, and
blankets; 8 poor food services;29 difficulties in access to medical care;"
falsification of payroll records;3' substandard housing;32 and death and
injury from transport accidents or exposure to dangerous chemicals.33
The United States instituted some changes to improve conditions and
comply with the bi-national agreement. For example, standards for living
conditions were made more specific, requiring employers to provide
"hygienic lodging without cost,"34 but it is unclear whether employers

actually adhered to the changed provisions.
In 1954, when the existing Bracero agreement expired, negotiations
between the United States and Mexico aimed at reaching a new
agreement broke down.35 The United States then followed through on a
threat to unilaterally recruit Braceros at the border without an
agreement with Mexico. 36 Negotiations subsequently resumed and the
two countries reached a new agreement within a month, but the incident
made it clear that Mexico's bargaining power was significantly weaker
than before.37

During the war years alone, the Bracero Program

brought

23. DRISCOLL, supra note 15, at 55.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 56; CALAVITA, supra note 13, at 24. Employers often failed to follow provisions in the
Bracero contracts by paying less than the minimum wage, delaying payment, incorrectly recording the
hours worked, or providing substandard food and housing. Lorenzo Alvarado, Comment, A Lesson
From My GrandfatherThe Bracero, 22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 55,73 (2001).
26. DRISCOLL, supra note i5,at 56.

27. ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR, THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 184-85 (1964).

28. Id. at 186-87.
29. Id. at 187-89.
30. Id. at 189-92.
31. Id. at 193-94.
32. Id. at 195.

33. Id.
34. CALAVITA, supra note 13, at 57.
35. Id. at 65. The main issues of contention were border recruitment, determination of the
prevailing wage, and the amount of the subsistence payments for unemployed Braceros. Id. at 65-66.
36. Id. at 66.
37. Id.
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approximately 168,ooo workers to the United States. 3 It continued until
1964 and at its peak provided visas for over 400,000 Mexicans a year to
work in the United States.39 Over the twenty-year course of the program,
five million foreign workers were contracted to work in twenty-four
states.'
The Bracero Program provided agricultural employers
temporary labor willing to work for low wages." The Braceros were,
essentially, part of a captive workforce whose livelihoods were
dependent on staying with the employers who sponsored their visas.'
Leaving in search of higher wages or better working conditions meant
abandoning the Bracero Program and forfeiting the opportunity to
participate in the future.43
C.

RECRUITMENT AND REPATRIATION

In addition to working and living in substandard conditions,
Braceros became pawns in an ongoing pattern of recruitment and
repatriation of Mexican workers.' Periods of recruitment, followed by
mass repatriation efforts, were not a new thing for Mexican workers."
During the Great Depression, Mexicans were widely blamed for
unemployment resulting in a major "repatriation" of Mexican
immigrants from 1929 to 1934.46 According to the Mexican government,
345,000 Mexicans were returned to their country of origin between 1929
and 1932.47

This cycle began again in 1952 when Congress passed the "Wetback
Act" to discourage illegal immigration from Mexico." The act allowed
border patrol officers to enter and patrol private land within twenty-five
feet of the border in order to stop illegal immigration.4 ' A major
38. MASSEY ET AL.. supra note I,at 36 (identifying the "war years" as the period from 1942 to
1945).
39. Laura C. Oliviera, Comment, A License to Exploit: The Need to Reform the H-2A Temporary
or Agricultural Guest Worker Program, 5 SCHOLAR 153, 162 (2002); Bruce Goldstein, Farmworker
Justice Fund, Inc., The Basics About Guest Worker Programs (2004), at http://www.fwjustice.org/
GWbasics.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005). More than seventy percent of Bracero workers were
Mexican but the program was also available to workers from other nations, including Barbados, the
Bahamas, and Canada. EDWARDS & GIMPEL, supra note 6, at 97.
40. CALAVITA, supra note 13, at I.
41. See id. at 70-72.
42. Id. at 74.
43. Id.
44. James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants?An HistoricalExamination of United
States Immigration Policy, I U.C. DAvis J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 244 (1995).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 243.
47. Id.
48. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 8, 66 Stat. 163, 228-29 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1988));
see also Smith, supranote 44, at 245-46.
49. Smith, supra note 44, at 245-46; see also E. WILLARD MILLER & RUBY M. MILLER, UNITED
STATES IMMIGRATION 25 (1996).
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"repatriation" of Mexican workers followed."
Recruitment and subsequent repatriation of Mexican workers
continued through the I95os." Despite the agricultural industry's
demand for workers, the early 1950s was a period of public outcry
against immigration.5 ' The post-Korean War recession, cold war
McCarthyism, 3 and claims by the President's Commission on Migratory
Labor that illegal immigrants were driving down wages, forcing domestic
workers to relocate, and threatening public health, all contributed to the
anti-immigrant sentiment. 4 As a result, the United States government
initiated "Operation Wetback" and between 1954 and 1958 millions of
individuals, including American citizens of Mexican descent, were
forcibly returned to Mexico without formal deportation proceedings.5
"Operation Wetback" was considered a success on two fronts: 6 first,
due to the sheer number of people who were removed from the United
States;57 second, when undocumented workers were apprehended they
were replaced by legal Braceros, which satisfied the farmers and
solidified the pattern of temporary contract agricultural workers."' It was
declared such a success by Commissioner of the INS, Joseph Swing, that
in 1951 he announced that the ....
wetback' problem' no longer
exist[ed]."" By forcefully expelling legal and undocumented Mexicansas well as United States citizens of Mexican descent-while at the same
time recruiting Braceros, the INS satisfied the public and the agricultural
industry while further marginalizing the Mexican worker.
D.

THE END OF THE BRACERO PROGRAM

After "Operation Wetback" a system developed in which just
enough Braceros were supplied to meet the demand for labor.6 The
growers made it clear that in the event there were not enough Braceros
to meet their needs they would employ "illegal aliens." 6' The INS was
50. MILLER & MILLER, supra note 49, at 21.

51. See CALAVrrA, supra note 13, for a comprehensive discussion of "Operation Wetback."
52. MASSEY ET AL., supra note i, at 37.
53. Id.; CALAVITA, supra note 13, at 50.
54. CALAVrrA, supra note 13, at 47 (citing President's Commission on Migratory Labor 69 (1951)).
The President's Commission on Migratory Labor was created by President Truman as a result of the
National Farm Labor Union's requests for an investigation into migrant farm workers. CALAVrrA,
supra note 13, at 47 n.23. For an indepth look at the adverse effects of migrant labor on domestic
workers, particularly regarding wages, see GALARZO, supra note 27, at 199-218.
55. HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED:
FURTIVE LIVES 13 (2oo).

56. CALAVrrA, supra note 13, at 54-55.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 55.
59. Id. at 55 (citing 1955 INS ANN. REP. 15).
60. Id. at 82.
6. Id. at 83.
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constantly short on resources and wanted to keep the number of
Mexicans entering the United States illegally as low as possible. 6
Therefore, it sided with growers in pushing for the continuation of the
Bracero system.6" On the other hand, it was the Department of Labor's
(DOL) responsibility to control the number of Braceros granted entry
and it faced pressure from labor unions and domestic workers to reduce
the number of Braceros. 64 This created tension between the INS and the
DOL as the INS supported an expanded Bracero Program while the
DOL favored a smaller one.6 5 Conflict between these government
agencies, fueled by the underlying struggle between growers and
domestic workers, continued to build through the late 195os and early
i 96os. 6
It was not until 1965 that the Bracero Program ended. 6' Numerous
factors, in addition to pressure from domestic workers, contributed to the
demise of the Program.68 A change in public ideology played a major
role. In the early i96os, the civil rights movement was gaining force;
welfare and labor unions enjoyed increasing influence on Congress; and
the Kennedy administration was less inclined to support the growers than
previous administrations. 69 Civil rights groups saw the Bracero Program
as exploitative and a CBS documentary portraying the difficult plight of
farm workers, entitled "Harvest of Shame," sparked public outcry.7" An
increasingly aware public had little tolerance for the Bracero Program.
In addition to pressure from the public, organized labor had grown
stronger and its influence on the DOL increased.7' In response, the DOL
issued a number of regulations making it more difficult for growers to
hire Braceros.72 In I965, the Bracero Program expired and was not reinstituted.73
The demand for Mexican labor that led to the creation of the
Bracero Program in the first place did not disappear along with the
Braceros.74 The wide availability of Mexican workers during the Bracero
years led growers, particularly in the Southwest, to become dependent on

62. Id. at 84.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 83.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.

Id. at 141-43.
MASSEY ET AL., supra note I, at 41.
Id.
CALAVrrA, supra note 13, at 142.
Id. at 143.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 143-49, 151.
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the low wages and work conditions that the Braceros accepted.7"
Likewise, the Bracero Program increased the pool of Mexican migrants
willing to come to the United States. 76 Those who came to the United
States developed familiarity with the labor market, established contacts,
and spread word of their experiences when they returned to Mexico.77
Not only were former Braceros more likely to return to work, they also
spurred interest in working in the United States amongst their friends
and family. Needless to say, the formal end of the Bracero Program did
not eliminate the immigration model that it had created.
E.

THE BEGINNING OF THE

H-2

PROGRAM

In 1952, in the midst of the Bracero Program, the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 [INA], also known as the McCarran-Walter Act,
was enacted. 78 The INA created the H-2 Visa. 9 It originated as a
nonimmigrant visa intended to allow workers to enter the United States
to perform temporary labor or services when the DOL certified that
"unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot
be found in this country."'s The INA provided for the entry of temporary
foreign workers under the H-2 program when there was a certifiable
labor shortage.' Unlike the Bracero Program, which was administered
by the DOL, the H-2 program was run by the INS.82 Mexicans were
excluded from the H-2 program during the Bracero era; however, as the
Bracero Program ended, the agricultural industry looked to the H-2
program as a possible means to meet its labor needs."
The H-2 Program exposed foreign workers to the U.S. job market in
the same way as the Bracero Program did, also leading to undocumented
immigration when visas were not available. 84 However, fewer workers
came to the United States under the H-2 visa than through the Bracero
Program because many employers felt that it took too long to bring
workers through the H-2 program.8 The H-2 visa continued in a limited
capacity until being revised by the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986.

75. MASSEY ET AL., supra note i, at 41-42.
76. Id. at 42.
77. Id.
78. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § Ioi(a)(15)(H)(ii) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ i ioi(a)(15)(H)(ii) (2005)).
79. Id.
So. id.
81. CALAVITA, supra note 13, at 148.
82. Id. at 134.

83. Id.
84. HAYES, supra note 55, at 31.
85. Id.
86. See infra Part lI.B.
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II. NEW TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION
This Part addresses immigration policies after the Bracero Program
ended. Particularly, it addresses the restrictions imposed on the number
of Mexican workers that were legally permitted to come to the United
States, the cycle of entry and deportation that developed through the
197os and i98os, and the enactment of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of I986. This Part concludes with a discussion of the current
state of immigration in the United States.
A.

THE CYCLE OF DEPORTATION AND REENTRY

From 1965 to 1986, the United States restricted entry of Mexican
workers to the United States. While the government changed
immigration policy to allocate a greater number of visas to European and
Asian citizens, the number of visas awarded to Mexican nationals
decreased substantially."' Illegal immigration entered heavily into the
political spotlight in the 197os as the United States suffered high inflation
and unemployment and low wages. 8 As a result, Congress amended the
INA, making it more difficult for documented immigrants to sponsor
visas for family members, applying the 2o,ooo-per-country visa limit to
the Western Hemisphere, and including Mexico in the preference
system."' By the mid-I98os, the number of visas granted to Mexicans was
dramatically reduced.'
At the same time that the United States reduced Mexicans' access to
visas, Mexico's population boomed and its economy declined." Mexican
workers continued to come to the United States, but now the vast
majority entered illegally." Between 1965 and 1986, an estimated 28
million Mexicans entered the United States without documents,
compared with 1.3 million documented Mexicans immigrants and 46,000
contract workers.93
A cycle of illegal entry followed by deportation and reentry became
firmly entrenched. Undocumented workers would enter the United
States illegally and, if apprehended, would go back to Mexico under the
voluntary departure program only to turn around and take up again on
the journey to the United States.94 From the late 1970s to the early I98os,
an undocumented worker entering the United States averaged a one in
87. MASSEY ET AL., supra note i, at 40. In 1968, Mexicans were included in the hemispheric limit
of 12o,ooo visas and thus forced to compete for visas with people from Central and South America and
the Caribbean. Id.at 43.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at42.
9I. Id. at 44.
92. Id.

93- Id. at 45.
94- Id. at 45-47-
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three chance of being apprehended.95 Nonetheless, high demand for
labor, willing
Mexican workers, and lax border enforcement contributed
96
to the cycle.
B.

IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF

1986

In 1986, under pressure for immigration reform, Congress enacted
the Immigration Reform and Control Act [IRCA]. 97 IRCA made major
changes in immigration policy and revised the H-2 program. 8 It was
restrictive in that it dramatically increased border control funding. 9
However, it also enacted amnesty programs'" and established the H-2A
program for agricultural workers and the H-2B program for laborers and
service workers. °1 Additionally, IRCA afforded greater labor protection
to agricultural workers and established civil and criminal penalties for
employers hiring illegal immigrants. 2
IRCA included a number of programs granting amnesty to illegal
immigrants. The Special Agricultural Worker [SAW] provision legalized
workers who could prove they had worked in agriculture for at least
ninety days between May 1985 and May 1986."°3 Additionally, to
complement SAW, a Replenishment Agricultural Worker [RAW]
provision was included to compensate for SAW workers that left
agriculture." IRCA also granted amnesty to undocumented immigrants
who could prove they had lived continuously in the United States since
January i, 1982.05

The North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] followed
I 6 NAFTA focused on
IRCA
beginning
in the late
openingwith
up discussions
trade between
the United
Statesi98os.
and Mexico
and virtually

95. Id. at 45.
96. Id.
97. Pub. L. No. 99-603, oo Stat. 3359 (1986); MASSEY El AL., supra note i,at 49.
98. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
99. Interview by Professor Douglas Massey with Robert Siegel discussing the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 8,
2004).
too. Pub. L. No. 99-603, too Stat. 3359, §§ 201, 302(a).
[of. 8 U.S.C. §§ Ito1(a)(t5)(H)(ii)(a) to (b) (20o5). While the IRCA did not limit the number of
H-2A visas, a 65,000 visa limit was set on H-2B visas. Goldstein, supranote 39.
102. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 80 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5684; Goldstein,
supra note 39.
103. Pub. L. No. 99-603, Ioo Stat. 3359, § 302(a); CALAVrA, supra note 13, at 168.
rO4. CALAvrrA, supra note 13, at t68. RAW enabled employers to contract with additional workers
to replace workers who left agriculture for more desirable employment upon becoming legal. Id.
105. Pub. L. No. 99-603, too Stat. 3359, § 303(a).
io6. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 18, 1992, Annex t, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473
(0994 & Supp. V 1999); M. Jeannette Yakamavich, Comment, NAFTA on the Move: the United States
and Mexico on a Journey Toward the Free Movement of Workers-A NAFTA Progress Report and EU
Comparison,8 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 463,470-71 (2002).
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ignored the issue of immigration.'" In 1994, while acting to remove trade
barriers, the Clinton administration increased border control measures
by fortifying the California-Mexico border. The project was titled
Operation Gatekeeper.' ° It included twenty-four hour helicopter
surveillance, electric sensors, and night vision along the border, as well as
construction of two parallel fences.'" Operation Gatekeeper drove illegal
immigrants to enter the United States through the harsh Arizona desert
rather than through California, resulting in many deaths."
In 1996, the Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility
Act was passed and it devoted yet more resources to border enforcement
and deterrence."' It also made it more difficult to sponsor a family
member and severely limited illegal immigrants' access to public
services." ' This sent a strong message that promoting free trade between
the United States and Mexico was high on the administration's agenda,
but enabling movement of individuals between the nations was an
entirely different issue and the United States was in no way preparing to
open its border with Mexico.
C.

IMMIGRATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Undocumented workers comprise a substantial portion of the
United States' work force and are important to the nation's economy. " '
The 2000 U.S. Census estimated that there were approximately 8.5
million undocumented immigrants residing in the United States." 4 From
1991 to 2001, one out of three undocumented aliens arriving to work in
the United States was from Mexico." 5 In addition, between 3 and 4.5
million undocumented workers were believed to be living in the United
States, according to a study released by the UCLA School of Public
Policy and Social Research. I,6 A study released by the Pew Hispanic
Center in 2001 reported between 3.4 and 5.8 million undocumented

1o7. Yakamavich, supranote io6, at 470-71.

io8. MASSEY ET AL., supra note I, at 94 (providing details of Operation Gatekeeper).
io9. American Immigration: Dreaming of the Other Side of the Wire, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. r2,

2005, at 67. For an in depth discussion of Operation Gatekeeper, see JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION
GATEKEEPER (2002).
I IO. American Immigration:Dreamingof the Other Side of the Wire, supra note io9, at 67.
11I. MASSEY El AL., supra note I, at 95.
112. Id.
t13. John Simons, Even in a Recession, the U.S. Economy Depends on Immigration and Mexico is
Depending on One Man to Improve the Fate of Those Crossing the Borders, FORTUNE, Nov. II, 2OO, at
92.
114. National Grassroots Legalization Collaborative, Legalization Fact Sheet: Why Do We Need A
Legalization Program For Undocumented Immigrants,at http://www.irnin.org/docs/
Legalization% 2oFact%2oSheet2.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
115. Simons, supra note 113.
116. Id.
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Mexican workers in the United States." 7 Current estimates indicate that
there are between 8 and io million undocumented foreign workers in the
United States, half of whom are Mexican nationals." Mexican
immigrants contributed $22o billion to the United States' economy in
2000.'9

Controlling the border constitutes a significant expenditure in the
federal budget. However, despite increased resources dedicated to
border enforcement, the number of people entering the United States
illegally each year has remained unchanged.' ° In an interview on
National Public Radio in January 2004, immigration expert Professor
Douglas Massey stated that between 1986 and 2000, the number of
border patrol officers was increased from fewer than 2,000 to more than
12,000,

while the budget was increased from below

$200

million to

approximately $1.3 billion in 2004.2 ' While the number of people
immigrating to the United States has remained relatively stable in
proportion to the population, the nature of undocumented immigration
has changed in the past century. Whereas in the beginning migrants came
seasonally and then returned home with their earnings, workers now stay
longer and often settle permanently in the United States.' 2 This is largely
a result of the increasing risk associated with crossing the border.'23 As
the costs of crossing the border illegally rise, temporary workers remain
in the United States longer rather than risk being apprehended at the
border when they decide to return.' 4
III. CURRENT GUEST WORKER VISA PROGRAMS
The following Part focuses on the H-2A visa for temporary
agricultural workers and discusses the policy goals and the actual
consequences of the visa program. Two visas are specifically for
agricultural and other low-skill workers: the H-2A and H-2B visas. The
H-2A visa is provided to aliens "having a residence in a foreign country
which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming temporarily to
the United States to perform agricultural labor or services..... The H-2B
117. Frank D. Bean et al., Estimates of Numbers of Unauthorized Migrants Living in the United
States: The Total, Mexican, and Non-Mexican Central American Unauthorized Populations in Mid2001, 2, at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/2.pdf (Jan. 24, 2002).
iI8. National Public Radio Morning Edition: How President Bush's Proposed Changes in
Immigration Will Affect Illegal Foreign Workers Who Are Already in the U.S. (N.P.R. radio broadcast,
Jan. 8, 2004).
1I9. Simons, supra note 113.
120. See Massey, supranote 99.
121. Id.
122. MASSEY ET AL., supra note I, at 42.
123. Id. at 128-29.
124. Id.; Kris Axtman, Illegal Border Crossings Plunge Amid Security, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR,
Nov. 9, 2001, at 3.
125. 8 U.S.C. § iloi(a)(I5)(H)(ii)(a) (2004).
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visa is directed to service and labor workers and provides visas to aliens
who meet the same requirements as agricultural workers coming under
the H-2A visa. ,6 The strict limits imposed on both the H-2 visas make
them inadequate to meet the United States' demand for labor.'27 This
Note focuses on the H-2A agricultural visa.
A. H-2A

AGRICULTURAL VISA

The H-2A visa permits the temporary or seasonal entry of
nonimmigrant aliens to work in agriculture in the case of a domestic
labor shortage.2 8 The DOL and the Department of Justice [DOJ] jointly
administer the program.'29 A potential employer must first file a petition
with the DOL asserting that there is a shortage of national workers "who
are able, willing, qualified, and available to work" and that "the
employment of foreign nationals will not adversely affect the wages and
working conditions of similarly employed United States workers" before
approval can be granted. 3 ° Meanwhile, a prospective worker must apply
for the H-2A visa in his home country.'3 ' If the DOL certifies that there is
a labor shortage, then the employer can be certified to hire workers
under the H-2A visa, and employer-linked visas can be issued.'32
Both employers and workers criticize the H-2A visa program."'
Employers lament that the program is too cumbersome; they must
anticipate labor needs and certify the demand for foreign workers well in
advance.'34 Employers are also required to provide housing and
transportation and pay workers a higher salary than they pay non-H-2A
workers, called an "adverse-effect wage," so that domestic workers
remain competitive.'35
Although workers are supposed to receive food, lodging, permission
to work legally, and slightly higher wages, many decline to apply for an
H-2A visa for a combination of reasons.' As the H-2A visa is attached
to a specific employer, it limits job flexibility and freedom to report

126. 8 U.S.C. § iioI(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) (2004).

127. See supraPart II.A.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Mayerle, supra note 20, at 564-65.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

133. Susan Carroll, Migrant Work Program Called Vulnerable to Abuse; Legal Labor in Middle;

Guest Worker Program Polarizes Backers, Aiuz. REPUBLIC, Feb. 8, 2004, at Ai; Tyche Hendricks,
Bush Guest Worker Plan Recalls Bracero Program, S.F. CHRON., Jan. i6, 2004, at Ax9; see Saxby
Chambliss, Opening Statement, Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Citizenship Committee on the Senate Judiciary (Feb. 12, 2004), 2004 WL 283551.
134. Carroll, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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abuse because such action may result in loss of both job and visa. 3 '
Under the visa, the worker must also return to his home country when
the agricultural season ends or else he becomes ineligible for a visa the
following season.' Furthermore, the H-2A visa does not provide a
means for workers to obtain permanent residence or citizenship, nor
does it allow for workers to bring their families. A recent DOL study
revealing that the vast majority of agricultural workers do not have visas
indicates the failure of the current H-2A program.'39 The study found
that sixty percent of farm workers in the United States are here
illegally.'4 In 2002, only 41,000 workers, of the estimated 2.5 million
agricultural workers, were certified for H-2A visas, 14' and in 2003 fewer
than 30,000 H-2A visas were issued." These statistics reflect the reality
that there is little incentive for employers or workers to use the H-2A
visa.
IV.

BEING A BETTER HOST: REFORM

The following Part discusses President Bush's guest worker proposal
and considers why actual reforms are yet to be implemented.

A.

TALKS OF REFORM END ABRUPTLY IN 2001

In August 2001 immigration was a hot issue.'43 President Bush and
President Fox were scheduled to meet in early September 2001." 4 Both
Democrats and Republicans made recommendations, including
suggestions for reworking the guest-worker program and for creating an
amnesty provision granting legal residency status to undocumented
foreigners who held jobs and paid taxes.'45 President Fox was also
137. While some critics of the current program criticize the potential for worker abuse under the
visas, other reform advocates cite the "frivolous lawsuits" filed by guest workers entering under the
H2A visa. See Chambliss, supra note 133.
138. Carroll, supranote 133.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Stuart Anderson, Executive Director, National Foundation for American Policy, Testimony
on Temporary Workers, Before the House Committee on Agriculture (Jan. 28, 2004), in 9-4 BENDER'S
IMMIGR. BULL. 33 (2004).
143. Hale E. Sheppard, Salvaging Trade, Economic and Political Relations With Mexico In The
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks; A Call for a Reevaluation of U.S. Law and Policy, 20 B.U. INTL'L
L.J. 33, 42 (2002); Jody A. Benjamin, Millions Cast Eyes on Bush Fox Talks, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 4,
2001, at A1; Eric Schmitt, Democrats Counter Administration on Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,

2001, at Ai9.

144. Mike Allen, Mexican President Urges Immigration Law Changes, WASH. POST., Sept. 9, 2001,
at A3; Schmitt, supra note 143.
145. Allen, supra note 144, at A3; Schmitt, supra note 143, at Ai9. In testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on U.S.-Mexico Migration on September 7, 2001, Stephen Moore, Senior Fellow
in Economics at the Cato Institute, emphasized the importance of providing guest-worker visas to
migrant workers from Mexico. Stephen Moore, Testimony on U.S. Mexico Migration, Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration, 107th Cong. (Sept. 7, 2001), 2001 WL
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pushing hard for immigration reform. 46 The political climate in Mexico
had changed dramatically from the Bracero days and President Fox was

experiencing

internal pressure

to create

a viable

and

humane

immigration agreement that would protect Mexican nationals living and
working in the United States. During his three-day visit to Washington in
early September, President Fox announced hopes that the two nations
would reach an agreement by the end of the year.'47 He encouraged
President Bush to grant legal status to the estimated
three million
8
undocumented Mexicans working in the United States.1

Talks of immigration reform, however, came to a standstill after the
terrorist attacks on September i, 200i.' ' It was not until two months
later, in November 2001, that Mexico and the United States resumed
discussions on immigration, and it was in a different and limited
capacity.50 This time it was Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle
and House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt who went to Mexico
to meet with President Fox."' Before meeting with President Fox, both
Senator Daschle and Congressman Gephardt emphasized publicly that
despite the events of September ii, they were both still committed to
immigration reform.'52 President Fox also relaxed his aggressive stance
on immigration reform while stressing the difference between foreign

terrorists and poor Mexicans who enter the United States to work."3
Congressman Gephardt, Senator Daschle, and Mexican officials all

1021790. Moore argued that (i) immigration from Mexico has remained steady since the I93os,
especially when considered in the context of the overall population; (2) "the new immigrants are
economically beneficial to the United States"; and (3) that "guest worker programs can help reduce
illegal immigration." Id. Moore suggested a broad policy allowing guest workers, with significant fines
and punishments for illegal immigration.
146. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President George
Bush and President Vicente Fox of Mexico at Arrival Ceremony (Sept. 5, 200), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2ooI/o9/2ooo905-2.html
(last visited Apr. 24, 2005)
[hereinafter Remarks by President George Bush]; Edwin Chen & James Smith, Fox Pushes for
MigrantsPact by End of Year, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at Al.
147. Sheppard, supra note 143, at 42; Allen, supra note 144; Chen & Smith, supra note 146;
Reuters, Democratic Supportfor Bush on Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2oo, at AI9. Fox outlined
his ambitious goal in his remarks at the arrival ceremony, stating:
[W]e must, and we can, reach an agreement on migration before the end of this very year,
which will allow us, before the end of our respective terms, to make sure that there are no
Mexicans who have not entered this country legally in the United States, and that those
Mexicans who have come into the country do so with the proper documents.

Remarks by President George Bush, supra note 146.
148. Sheppard, supra note 143, at 42; Allen, supra note 144; Chen & Smith, supra note 146;
Reuters, supra note 147.
149. Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, US. and Mexico to Resume Talks on Immigration Policy,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 15, 2001, at A4o.
150. Id.
I5. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.

IIIO

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1095

suggested that "identifying and legalizing" Mexican workers in the
United States could lead to increased national security.'54 Despite media
publicity, the post-September ii discussions did not culminate in
immigration reform, and the United States
continued to implement
55
increasingly restrictive immigration policy.
B.

IMMIGRATION REFORM IN 2004

In 2004, reform of the United States' immigration policy reentered
the national limelight. On January 7, 2004, President Bush proposed
plans for a new temporary worker program., 6 Without revealing specific
details, President Bush outlined a plan allowing temporary workers to
come to the United States on three-year work visas that would be
renewable on one occasion if the worker remained employed and
satisfied other program requirements. 5 7 President Bush proposed that,
like the Bracero Program, the new program would include incentives for
workers to return to their home countries. 5 He also emphasized that the
jobs must be prearranged and would only be open to foreign workers
when no American worker was available.'59 The proposal did not include
amnesty provisions.' 6° He proposed, however, that workers would be
allowed to travel freely between their country of origin and the United
States, and would be allowed to bring dependents
if they could prove
6
that they would be able to support them. '
After disagreements in late 2003 and early 2004, relations between
President Bush and President Fox were improving.' 6, On March 9, 2004,
President Fox traveled to the United States to meet with President Bush
for discussions on migration, trade, and national security.163 The
atmosphere was less charged than during the expectation-laden talks
154. Id.
155. Skeptics theorized that both Democrats and Republicans knew from the outset that

immigration reform would not take place yet engaged in talk of reform to garner political support.
Sheppard, supra note 143, at 44-45.
156. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Proposes New
Temporary Worker Program, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/o/2004OIO7-3.html

(Jan. 7, 2004); see also Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, FactSheet: Fair and
Secure Immigration Reform, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2oo4o/2oo4o107-i.html
(Jan. 7, 2004); Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Answers
Questions on Fairand Secure Immigration Reform, at http://usinfo.state.gov/ gi/Archive/2oo4/Jan/o7545562.html (Jan. 7, 2004).
157. PresidentBush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program,supra note 156.
i58. Id.
159. Id.
I6o. Id.
161. CBS & Associated Press, Big Change For Illegal Aliens?, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2004/1/o7/politics/main5919o7.shtml (Jan. 7, 2004).
162. Ginger Thompson, Grown Cautious, Fox Expects Delay on United States Action on Migrants,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A6.
163. Id.
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three years before, but President Fox expressed support for the Bush
plan as a first step in the right
administration's immigration reform
64
direction for immigration policy.'
V.

PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSAL

President Bush's proposed temporary worker plan engendered much
debate. In February 2004, at the first of an anticipated series of hearings
evaluating guest worker programs, Senator Saxby Chambliss, a
Republican senator from Georgia, outlined the core objectives of
President Bush's proposal.' 6' While emphasizing the need for strong
border enforcement and internal security, Senator Chambliss also
stressed the United States' demand for guest workers.' 6 This proposal
both appeased those seeking strict border control and satisfied the
agricultural industry, which supports an expanded guest worker visa
guidelines regarding the
program with extended visa duration and clear
6
costs for which the employer is responsible. ,
A.

CRITIQUE OF BUSH'S PROPOSAL

Although the United States needs immigration reform, President
Bush's temporary worker plan is weak in a number of areas and, if
implemented, is unlikely to provide a long-term solution. Primarily, (I) it
does not provide any means for immigrants to improve their status
within the United States; (2) it does not provide an incentive to workers
to apply for a temporary visa; (3) it does not include wage or labor
protections; and (4) there is no amnesty provision.
I. Status of Mexican Workers in the United States
President Bush's proposal will not enable workers to improve their
status in the United States because the visa will be linked to a specific
employer. While members of the agricultural industry may support
President Bush's proposal, organized labor and immigrants' rights
organizations are generally skeptical.' 6" Undocumented agricultural
164. Id.
165. Chambliss, supra note 133.
166. Id. Senator Chambliss stated that:
Even with our best efforts, illegal immigration remains a vast problem that is getting more
and more out of control. Most estimates say there are 8 to io million illegal aliens in the
United States. Of those, it is estimated that 6o% entered the United States without
inspection, which is a criminal offense. Such a large number of illegal aliens creates a
financial drain due to non-reimbursed medical and educational services, burdens our
judicial system, and allows criminal acts to go unchecked.
Id. Senator Chambliss emphasized the distinction between illegal and legal workers and the need to
prevent any illegal immigration while bringing immigrants in through a guest worker program in order
to fill gaps in the U.S. labor market. Id.
167. William L. Brim, President, Lewis Taylor Farms, Impact of Guest Workers on Agriculture,
Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 2004 WL 162701 (Jan. 28, 2004).
168. T. Shawn Taylor, Critics Bash Work Visa Proposal, CH. TRIBUNE, Jan. 13, 2004, at C 4 ;

1112

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vo1. 56:1i 95

workers in the United States are subject to many disadvantages. They are
not eligible for federal programs; and they pay money into a social
security system which pays them nothing in return. Nonetheless, the69
United States economy has proved to be dependent on these workers,'
and as President Bush's proposal to increase the number of temporary
work visas indicates, the United States government does not want to lose
access to immigrant labor.
President Bush's proposal continues to link workers' visas to specific
employers. Linking temporary work visas to employers, as is currently
the case with the visa program, hurts the worker and the employers.
First, it is not compatible with the industries that the temporary worker
program serves. 7 ' Agricultural jobs are often of limited duration and
workers change employers frequently; both employers and workers want
flexibility. 7 ' Employer-linked visas are especially bad for the workers
because being tied to a specific employer puts the worker at the mercy of
that employer.'72 If workers must keep prearranged jobs in order to keep
their visas, they are inclined to accept lower wages and unfit or
dangerous working conditions rather than risk losing their visas.'73
Linking the visa to the employer essentially creates a class of voiceless
laborers who must accept whatever is asked of them in order to keep
their employment and remain in the United States.
2.
Omission of Wage and Labor Provisions
In a striking deviation from the current H-2A program, and the
former Bracero Program, President Bush's proposal does not include
wage or labor protections.'74 This is bad for both temporary foreign
workers and workers in the United States.'75 Employers will pay, and
temporary workers will accept, wages below those that native workers
will accept. Employers can also maintain work conditions at levels that
are unacceptable to native workers. Because the dollar is generally much
stronger than the Mexican peso, it is still economically beneficial for
Mexican workers to accept substandard wages and conditions. Without
wage and labor provisions, unemployed domestic workers are underbid
while foreign workers are forced to work in inhumane conditions.
President Bush's failure to include wage and labor provisions in his

Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc., The President's Temporary Foreign Worker Proposalis Ill-Conceived,
at http://www.fwjustice.org/bush-policy.htm (last visited Apr. II, 2005).
169. See supra text accompanying note i 19.
170. Taylor, supra note 168.
171. Id.
172. Goldstein, supra note 39.
173. id.
174. Farmworker Justice Fund, supra note i68. Both the current H-2A visa program and the

Bracero Program included wage and labor provisions. Id.
175. Id.
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proposed temporary worker plan is76 unjust to immigrant laborers and is
to the detriment of native workers.
3. Proposed Temporary Worker Plan Does Not Provide an
Incentive For Undocumented Workers to Apply for the Visa
President Bush's proposed temporary worker program does not
provide an incentive for undocumented workers to apply because it does
not offer priority in Green Card processing or any other means of
acquiring citizenship or long-term legitimate status. To apply for a Green
Card undocumented workers must
still return to their home country and
77
the wait can last up to ten years.'
Lawmakers claim that the proposed temporary worker plan will
improve national security because the government will be able track
immigrants once they have applied to the program. T7 Although this is
theoretically a possibility, temporary workers, especially those already
living in the United States, must receive some benefit from the visa
before they will apply. Immigrants, primarily undocumented workers,
who have been working here for many years will not apply for the
temporary visa if they know that it does not afford priority in receiving a
Green Card.' Furthermore, undocumented workers are well-aware that
the waiting list to receive a Green Card is long and the three-year
temporary worker visa is likely to expire before they receive permanent
residence. Thus, the temporary worker visa, which can legalize a
worker's immigration status for up to six years if that worker meets all
the requirements for renewal, may actually jeopardize workers' longterm well-being. Individuals will be easier to track and, thus, more likely
to face deportation to Mexico when their visas expire.
Currently, the government awards 140,ooo Green Cards every year.
While five thousand go to low-skilled workers, the majority go to
professionals and skilled workers.'8' White House Spokeswoman Claire

Buchanan has tried to address concerns regarding President Bush's
omission of Green Card provisions by indicating that the President may
propose an exception for formerly undocumented immigrants
participating in the guest worker program."" The administration,
however, has yet to reveal any specific plans.""
While President Bush

176. Farmers often claim that they are unable to find United States citizens who are able and
willing to work. A more accurate way to frame their conundrum is to say that they are not able to find
native workers who are willing to work under the conditions demanded.
177. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Catch-22 Seen in Immigration Plan, L.A. TiMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at
A14.
178. President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program,supra note 156.
179. Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 177, at As4.
18o. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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proposes that the guest worker program will promote national security
because the government will be able to register and monitor immigrants,
as long as there is no incentive to apply for the temporary worker visa,
'83
undocumented immigrants are not likely to participate in the program.
4. No Amnesty Provision
President Bush's proposed temporary worker plan does nothing to
facilitate temporary workers acquiring permanent residence or
citizenship in the United States. This does not reflect the reality of
immigration between the United States and Mexico. The proposed visa
would allow a worker a maximum stay of six years. After working six
years in the United States, however a worker may be even more
dependent on work in the United States as a means of providing for
himself and his family than before first coming. Furthermore, the worker
is likely to have developed connections in the United States enabling him
to return more easily, albeit illegally. After the six-year term of the visa
expires, there is no way for a worker to immigrate legally, yet work will
still be available. Many formerly legal workers who entered under
President Bush's proposed plan will become undocumented workers
when the visa expires.
Immigration exPerts have likened President Bush's current proposal
to the 1986 IRCA.' In addition to other differences, IRCA, however,
included provisions for employer sanctions and amnesty provisions.' 8
President Bush's proposed plan does not include an amnesty
provision, an important component of IRCA."6 Millions of
undocumented workers in the United States form an integral part of the
national economy and social fabric.'8 7 It has been almost a decade since
the IRCA offered amnesty, and many people are living in limbo. While
many argue that it is poor policy to reward illegal immigration with
amnesty, this argument ignores the reality that there is a demand for
labor in the United States and much of that demand is satisfied by
undocumented workers. 18 Although expanding the temporary worker
visa program may temporarily afford legal status to a number of
183. Id.
184. See supra Part ll.B.
185. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(L)(A) it is illegal "to [knowingly] hire, or to recruit or refer for a

fee" an unauthorized alien for employment in the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the INS must be able to prove the employer had constructive knowledge that the employee
was illegal. See Collins Foods Int'l., Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 9r). It is sufficient for the
employer to rely on documents presented by the employee that "reasonably appear to be genuine." Id.
at 554 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. I, at 62 (1986)); see Jorge A. Vargas, Border Patrol Abuses,
Undocumented Mexican Workers, and International Human Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. t, 81
(2001).

186. Supra Part II.B.
187. See id.
188. See supra Part II.A.
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undocumented workers, if all undocumented workers currently living in
the United States were to apply, and then extend their visas, six years
from now the United States would find itself in the same position as it is
in today. There is no reason to believe that workers living in the United
States illegally prior to receiving the temporary work visa would leave
when the visa expired. Therefore, many undocumented workers would
return to undocumented status when their visas expired.
Indeed, many experts and immigration policy groups are skeptical
whether President Bush's plan can ever meet the labor demands of the
agricultural industry."" Claudia Smith, director of California Rural Legal
Assistance, an immigrant advocacy grouped based in Oceanside,
California,"9 is one of the skeptics. In an interview with CBS, she stated
that she does not believe the proposed visa program will not be large
enough to accommodate the demand of Mexicans seeking work or of
United States' industries seeking undocumented labor.'9 ' She reasoned,
therefore, that the visa would have little impact on the number of
individuals entering the United States illegally '
An additional difference between President Bush's proposal and
IRCA is that the President has not stated that he will include sanctions
against employers that hire undocumented immigrants. While employer
sanctions have not proved successful in curbing illegal immigration,
implementing such sanctions is often suggested. One problem with
previous attempts at employer sanctions is that they have never been
strictly enforced.'93 As the Ninth Circuit found when determining
whether an employer was guilty of knowingly employing an
undocumented worker based on fraudulent documents, "the legislative
history of section I324a indicates that Congress intended to minimize the
burden and the risk placed on the employer in the verification
process."'" In practice, employer sanctions have proved ineffective to
stop employment of illegal workers and have merely served to
restructure the agricultural hiring process to include middlemen, thereby
decreasing overall wages.'95 To effectively deter employers from hiring
workers who do not have visas, sanctions must be consistently and
diligently enforced.
189. Id.

i9o. More information about California Rural Legal Assistance's ideology, projects and services is
available on their web-page. See California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., at http://www.crla.org.
191. CBS & Associated Press, supra note 161.
192. Id.
193. Vargas, supra note 185, at 81.
194. Collins Foods Int'l., Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cit. i99i) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
(20o4)).
195. See Massey, supra note 99. Instead of hiring workers directly, employers often hire through
labor subcontractors, and all workers, including citizens and legal resident aliens, must now seek
employment through these subcontractors. Id.
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AN ARGUMENT FOR PROVIDING A PATH TO CITIZENSHIP: LOOKING TO
THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE

Germany's experience engaging in a guest worker program with
Turkey can be viewed as an example of what happens when a nation
adopts a guest worker program but does not offer the guest workers a
path towards citizenship. Germany is currently home to many Turkish
immigrants who went to Germany in 1961 as part of a bilateral treaty
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey to bring Turks to
Germany as guest workers.' The program was initiated during the postWorld War II labor shortage in Germany and lasted until 1973.'"
Because workers were only to stay temporarily, the program did not
offer a means for the Turkish workers to become citizens nor did it invest
resources in teaching them German or integrating them into German
society.'98
Both Germany and Turkey maintained that the guest worker
program was temporary and always referred to the Turkish workers as
"workers," not "immigrants. '' 9" Nonetheless, many of the Turkish
"temporary workers" remained in Germany but never became citizens.2°
Obtaining German citizenship was very difficult for the Turkish workers
who remained."' Although citizenship requirements were relaxed in
2000, prior to then Germany required fifteen years of residence and
required individuals to renounce other citizenships."' Furthermore,
individuals born in Germany are not automatically citizens; therefore,
the children of the Turkish workers are also foreign nationals.2" As a
consequence, Turks who participated in the guest worker program and
continued living in Germany formed an immigrant subclass; a large
population of alien Turks in Germany are subject to discrimination,
experience higher rates of unemployment and substandard education
and housing. 4
The long-term implications of a guest worker program in the United
States may be different than in Germany because the United States
grants citizenship to individuals born within its borders. Germany's
experience is important, however, because it shows that it is unrealistic
196. Nedim Ogelman et al., ImmigrantCohesion and PoliticalAccess in Influencing Foreign Policy,
22.2 SAIS REVIEW 145, 147 (2002).

197. Don Melvin, When Guest Workers Opt Not to Go Home; German Examples Show Some
MigrantPolicies Lead to Isolation Poverty, AUSTIN AMER. STATESMAN, Feb. I, 2004, at HI.

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Cf.Howard F. Chang, Essay, Liberal Ideals and PoliticalFeasibility: Guest-Worker Programs
as Second-Best Policies, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. &CoM. REG. 465, 472 (2002).
204. Melvin, supra note 197, at Hi.
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and shortsighted to contend that any guest worker program will not
result in the permanent settlement of at least a portion of the guest
workers, especially when there is significant economic disparity between
the sending and the receiving nations. Any guest worker program that
focuses on bringing workers temporarily, and does not create a long-term
plan to assimilate immigrants remaining in the country, will not succeed
as a long-term program. 5
VI. PROPOSALS FOR CREATING A VIABLE, LONG-TERM
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM

Analysis of past temporary worker programs illustrates that they do
not prevent illegal immigration or fully protect workers' rights.?°
Historical analysis does suggest, however, that in order to have any
modicum of success, a guest worker program must: (I) provide a means
for temporary workers to become permanent residents or citizens; (2)
offer benefits to employers that hire workers through the temporary
worker program; (3) enact and enforce wage and labor provision; and (4)
make the visas specific to the individual worker, not the employer. These
measures, if followed, provide incentive for workers to participate in the
program and set the minimum standards for a functioning, nonexploitative guest worker program. However, as past programs have
illustrated, if all components of the program are not followed closely
problems develop that undermine the legitimacy and success of the
program.
First, guest worker legislation must provide a means for temporary
workers to become permanent residents or citizens. This is essential to
avoid creating a sub-class of non-citizen undocumented workers. The
same factors that drive individual guest workers to migrate to the United
States in the first place are likely to drive some to overstay their visas. As
long as employment is available and workers are not individually
monitored and forcibly deported upon visa expiration, workers will stay.
The United States' and Germany's experiences with guest worker
programs reveal what happens when guest workers remain in the visagranting country but are not able to become legal residents. The former
guest workers live in limbo. They are unable to fully integrate into
society because they are not legally inside the country and they may
suffer discrimination on a variety of levels. In the United States,
immigrants' children, who will be United States citizens if bom inside the
country, are also likely to face disadvantages stemming from their
parents' status. Enacting a guest worker program that allows workers

Chang, supra note 203, at 472.
206. See MASSEY ET AL., supra note j; Ogelnan et al., supra note 196, at 146-47 (discussing social
205.

position of Turks in Germany); Vargas, supra note 185, at 86.
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who meet certain requirements to become permanent residents"°7 will
reward and protect those workers who go through legal channels to work
in the United States. While a guest worker program that provides a path
to permanent residency is not truly a temporary worker program, it
addresses the reality that many guest workers remain long after their
program ends.
Additionally, the guest worker program should be available, at least
in the beginning, to undocumented workers already inside the United
States. This will provide amnesty to those workers who are currently
undocumented yet want to participate in the program. Because the path
to legal residency would be potentially available to all program
participants, it would not "reward" individuals who had entered the
country illegally, rather, it would motivate those workers who want to
remain in the United States to participate in the guest worker program.
Second, the guest worker program must offer benefits to employers
that hire workers through the guest worker program, and sanctions must
be consistently enforced against employers that hire undocumented
workers. Employers will not hire workers through the guest worker
program unless there is a benefit to them. This benefit can come in the
form of access to a reliable labor pool as well as freedom from possible
sanctions. If employers are able to hire guest workers without excessive
bureaucratic delays, and the administrative costs are lower than the
sanctions they face for hiring undocumented workers, they are apt to
participate. Employer sanctions have not been effective in the past."'
However, if the standard for holding employers responsible for accepting
obviously fraudulent documents is raised"° and the sanctions are
consistently enforced, the cost of hiring undocumented workers will he
higher than the cost of hiring guest workers. Hiring workers through the
guest worker program should be the only reasonable option for
agriculture employers seeking non-domestic labor.
Third, wage and labor provisions must be included and enforced.
They are necessary to protect the well-being of the guest workers and to
ensure that domestic workers are not edged out of the market by nonnative workers willing to accept lower wages and substandard working
conditions. Employers must be required to pay guest workers fair wages
for their labor. The wage can be determined based on the state and
national minimum wages, the cost of living in the regions and the wages
paid to domestic workers for similar work. Once the wage is determined,
207. For example, permanent resident status could be granted to guest workers who have renewed
their visas three times consecutively and who meet other requirements for immigration to the United
States.
2o8. See Massey, supra note 99.
a
209. Collins Foods Int'l., Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 8 U.S.C. § I324
(2004)).
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employers must pay workers that wage. To ensure this, workers must be
able to file grievances with the administrating agency when they are paid
less, the employers should be actively investigated and employers must
not be able to punish workers who speak up. Employers caught paying
less than the minimum wage must face stiff fines and be prohibited from
hiring guest workers in the future.
In addition to wage provisions, labor provisions are necessary to
ensure the safety of the guest workers and to prevent abusive working
conditions. Employers should be required to provide safety equipment,
protection from harmful chemicals, adhere to maximum hour limits, and
adopt other labor protection as deemed necessary. The same agency that
ensures that wages are enforced should address grievances regarding
working conditions and proactively ensure that the provisions are
followed in the fields.
Finally, the visa should belong to the individual worker; agricultural
workers should not be dependent on a specific employer to sponsor their
visas. When a worker's visa is contingent on working for a particular
employer, his power to complain about wages, working conditions, or
other violations of the guest worker contract is limited. He must accept
the conditions imposed on him or forfeit his opportunity to work legally
in the United States. If a worker is able to register directly with the
administrating agency program to obtain the guest worker visa, and then
contract with specific employers once inside the United States, he has the
freedom to avoid abusive employers and to speak up against violations
without risking both his job and his visa. Additionally, if employers know
that workers can change employers they will be more apt to follow the
provisions of the guest worker contracts.
If the above conditions are satisfied, the guest worker program is
more likely to be a success because both workers and employers will
have an incentive to participate. Undocumented agricultural workers are
currently able to enter the United States and find work; in order for a
worker to participate in a guest worker program he must get something
out of it. I propose that guest workers have the opportunity to obtain
permanent resident status and that wages and labor conditions improve.
Employers must also be encouraged to participate. This can be achieved
by rigorously enforcing sanctions against employers who violate terms of
the guest worker contract and by streamlining the hiring process to make
it more suited to the employer's labor needs.
VII. CONCLUSION

The crucial element of any guest worker program is that it
recognizes that the workers entering under it are not truly temporary. A
successful program acknowledges that many of the workers will remain
in the country and creates a means for workers to obtain legal residency.
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It should include wage and labor provisions to protect workers and
ensure that employers hire workers through the program and adhere to
the contracts. While President Bush is moving in the right direction by
addressing the need for reform of the agricultural worker program, if his
proposed plan is not modified to include the aforementioned elements,
many employers will continue to hire undocumented workers, and many
of the workers that do participate will become undocumented
immigrants once their visas expire. As long as there is significant
economic disparity between the United States and Mexico, immigration
will continue. One realistic solution to reducing the market for illegal
labor and protecting immigrant laborers is implementing and enforcing a
guest worker program that includes the four components listed above.

